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Jennifer S. James and Julian M. Alston* 
A conventional assumption of product homogeneity when the commodity of interest is 
actually heterogeneous will lead to errors in an analysis of the incidence of policies, such 
as taxes. In this article, an equilibrium displacement model is used to derive analytical 
solutions for price, quantity, and quality eﬀects of ad valorem and per unit taxes. The 
results show how parameters determine the eﬀects of tax policies on quality. The 
potential for tax-induced distortions in quality, and the distributive consequences of 
those distortions, are illustrated in a case study of the market for Australian wine. 
1. Introduction 
When conducting policy analyses, economists often use a model of an 
homogeneous good. However, commodities are increasingly heterogeneous 
and policy eﬀects are likely to diﬀer among various qualities of a particular 
commodity. An homogeneous-good model will fail to account for the 
diﬀerent eﬀects, and for policy-induced changes in the distribution of quality 
(or average quality). This article introduces a useful approach to modelling 
quality and applies it to formally link quality changes to tax policies, with a 
view to increasing our understanding of how policies inﬂuence quality at the 
market level. 
Quality variation is incorporated in an equilibrium displacement model 
in which the commodity of interest is available in two qualities. This 
representation simpliﬁes the nature of heterogeneity of most agricultural 
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commodities, but two qualities are suﬃcient to demonstrate how quality 
responds to various policies, while keeping the model as simple as possible. 
The model is used to show the theoretical price, quantity, and quality eﬀects of 
ad valorem and per-unit tax policies in a closed economy. Analytical 
expressions for the errors from assuming product homogeneity are derived 
under the assumption that the high- and low-quality goods of interest comprise 
a weakly separable group. Solutions from this analytical model show which 
parameters play a key role in determining quality responses, and when these 
quality responses may be important components of policy outcomes. 
The potential importance of quality responses to tax policies is illustrated 
with an application to Australian wine. When the goods and services tax 
(GST) was introduced in 2000, the existing ad valorem wholesale taxes on 
wine were to be replaced with a wholesale tax that, when combined with the 
10 per cent GST, would be tax revenue neutral. Policy decisions included the 
size of the revenue-neutral tax, as well as how the tax should be speciﬁed – on 
a per unit or ad valorem basis. Based on intuition about individual 
behaviour, a per unit tax would be expected to increase the incentive to 
produce high-quality wine, relative to lower-quality cask wines. This paper 
derives theoretical results that show the conditions under which this 
argument is (and is not) valid at the market level, and presents results from 
empirical analysis in a stylised model of the Australian wine market. The 
numerical analysis demonstrates the potential empirical importance of tax-
induced distortions in quality premiums, and the distributive consequences of 
those distortions. While the government has already made the decision to 
implement an ad valorem tax, the issue of distributional consequences of 
diﬀerent types of wine taxes will surely arise again. Hence, it is useful to seek 
to understand the eﬀects of the recent policy choice, with a view to providing 
information that may be helpful in future choices. 
The contribution of this paper is more general. The fact that agricultural 
commodities are becoming more heterogeneous and output quality is 
becoming more important relative to output quantity means that we should 
re-think how we conduct policy analysis. Questions about how tax (or other) 
policies aﬀect diﬀerent qualities of a commodity diﬀerentially and about how 
various speciﬁcations of those policies may aﬀect their price, quantity, 
quality, and welfare outcomes are certain to arise in Australia and elsewhere. 
This paper contributes to this more general set of questions by its 
development of an approach to modelling quality variation, by decomposing 
policy responses into scale and substitution eﬀects about which we may have 
some intuition (e.g., their directions and relative sizes), and by identifying key 
parameters that are important determinants of quality responses to policy. 
Using this framework, we ﬁnd that: (i) there are important diﬀerences 
in quality implications between ad valorem and per unit taxes, (ii) even 
  
  
ad valorem taxes have quality implications once we allow for fairly general 
representations of consumer preferences for goods like wine, and (iii) in the 
case of Australian wine taxes, it is likely that the quality eﬀects are large and 
the distributional implications are serious. 
2. Previous models of quality responses to policies 
Perhaps the best-known example of quality responses is the Alchian and 
Allen theorem, or why we ‘ship out the good apples’ (Borcherding and 
Silberberg 1978). The theorem postulates the eﬀects of transportation costs 
on the relative consumption of high-quality and low-quality goods. The 
original example given by Alchian and Allen (1964) concerned ‘good’ and 
lower-priced ‘bad’ grapes, both grown in California. They noted that the cost 
of transporting grapes to, say, New York is the same for all shipments of 
grapes, regardless of their quality. From an individual consumer’s perspec­
tive, prices are ﬁxed so that the price of each quality of grapes increases by 
the amount of the transportation costs (per unit) for consumers in New 
York. Thus, good grapes become relatively cheaper for a consumer in New 
York, and hence, a New Yorker will consume a larger proportion of good 
grapes relative to a person in California who has identical preferences. While 
Alchian-Allen eﬀects are usually discussed in the context of transportation 
costs, the hypothesised increase in the consumption share of high-quality 
goods could occur as a result of many other types of per-unit costs 
(as discussed by Umbeck 1980). The primary criteria for a per-unit cost to 
generate the Alchian-Allen result are that whatever gives rise to the cost does 
not change the good itself, and that it does not have any inherent economic 
value in and of itself – i.e., the cost acts just like a per-unit tax. 
The reasoning behind the Alchian-Allen eﬀect is that changes in relative 
prices drive changes in relative consumption. While intuitive, the eﬀect is 
theoretically unambiguous only in a two-good world with no income eﬀects 
(Gould and Segall 1969). Borcherding and Silberberg (1978) argued that 
while it is possible for the Alchian-Allen theorem to be negated with the 
introduction of a third good, unless the high- and low-quality products have 
very diﬀerent consumption relationships with the third good, the standard 
Alchian-Allen result will hold. Notably, while most of the work in this area 
has focused on the eﬀects on consumer choices, a similar analysis of a proﬁt­
maximising ﬁrm would generate the same prediction (an increase in average 
quality when a per unit cost is incurred). Each of these studies focused on the 
behaviour of an individual consumer (or producer) for whom prices are 
exogenous, such that the economic agent of interest absorbs the entire 
per unit cost. At the market level, however, such costs are shared by 
consumers and producers. While Alchian-Allen eﬀects are often observed in 
  
  
market-level behaviour (Bertonazzi et al. 1993), previous work has not 
shown the theoretical conditions under which such eﬀects would be found at 
the market level. 
Barzel (1976) used a diﬀerent theoretical framework to analyse the problem 
at the market level in his alternative approach to taxation. The basis of his 
approach is that every commodity is more or less a bundle of characteristics, 
similar to Lancaster’s (1966) ‘new’ approach to consumer theory. Barzel (1976) 
noted that an ad valorem tax applies to a commodity’s entire value, so it taxes 
all of the commodity’s characteristics. In contrast, if a per unit tax is imposed 
the tax statute will use a subset of characteristics to deﬁne the commodity, 
assuming that an exhaustive description is either impossible or very costly. As a 
result, the per unit tax actually taxes only those characteristics used to deﬁne the 
commodity. Barzel (1976) showed that a predictable outcome is that the 
quantity of the deﬁning characteristics (speciﬁed in the tax statute) will decrease 
in response to a per unit tax, and the additional characteristics, which are not 
subject to the tax because they are not speciﬁed in the statute, will increase on a 
per unit basis – an increase in quality. 
The work by Barzel (1976) provides valuable insight into quality responses 
at the market level. However, an explicit representation of product 
characteristics requires some speciﬁcation of how the characteristics are 
combined to make units of the commodity. Work inspired by Barzel’s (1976) 
alternative approach to taxation demonstrated the importance of this 
speciﬁcation: changes in how characteristics were bundled could even reverse 
the quality eﬀects that Barzel (1976) found.1 Of particular importance is the 
degree of substitutability between quantity and quality, which is usually 
implicit in the particular functional form for the hedonic price function in 
such studies. Barzel’s (1976) speciﬁcation implied an elasticity of substitution 
between quantity and quality equal to one, whereas Kay and Keen (1987) 
implicitly speciﬁed no substitutability between quantity and quality, and 
found the converse eﬀect. 
Hedonic models have been used widely to represent and measure the price 
premiums paid for particular quality attributes of a range of goods, including 
wine.2 These studies have given us an idea of the relative magnitudes of 
premiums for various quality attributes, and the role labelling or reputation 
plays in determining price. However, hedonic models have a number of 
limitations in relation to the analysis of the market-level price, quantity, and 
1 See Bohanon and Van Cott (1984, 1991), Kaempfer and Brastow (1985), Kay and Keen 
(1987, 1991), and Cowen and Tabarrok (1995). A more detailed discussion of these papers and 
the related modelling issues may be found in James (2000). 
2 See Oczkowski (2001) for a comprehensive list of hedonic studies of wine prices, and a 
review of their main empirical ﬁndings. 
  
  
quality impacts of policies. Hanemann (1982) pointed out that the need to 
specify a functional form for the hedonic price function was a drawback to 
using these models for applied demand analysis. In addition, the speciﬁcation 
of the hedonic price function determines the ﬁndings regarding policy 
outcomes, which imposes a serious limitation on the usefulness of hedonic 
models in studies of the eﬀects of policies. Further, incorporating policy 
instruments is diﬃcult, as shown in Rosen (1974), where a number of 
simplifying assumptions had to be imposed to derive analytical results. 
In the hedonic approach, quality of commodities changes continuously, 
with continuous changes in their characteristics. In this paper, we model 
discrete quality variation; diﬀerent qualities are represented as distinct goods. 
It remains necessary to aggregate across qualities within the good being 
modelled, and to treat them as homogeneous. This approach is similar to the 
studies of the Alchian-Allen eﬀect in that it treats diﬀerent qualities of a 
commodity as distinct goods, and allows for conventional multi-market 
modelling approaches to be applied. This approach avoids the need to make 
assumptions about how characteristics are bundled into goods, and it has the 
further virtue that the speciﬁc assumptions that are imposed, such as the 
number of qualities included and the separability assumptions, are fairly 
transparent. 
3. A multi-market approach to modelling quality 
The eﬀects of taxes in a closed economy are modelled by specifying a 
multi-market equilibrium displacement model, as used, for example, by 
Buse (1958), Muth (1964), Perrin (1980), Alston (1986, 1991), Piggott 
(1992), and Alston et al. (1995). The commodity of interest is assumed to 
be available in two qualities, low and high, with some substitution between 
the two qualities, in both demand and supply. Changes in the distribution 
of consumption and production between low and high qualities are 
interpreted as changes in the average quality of the general commodity 
type. In this section we present the two-commodity model, which we use to 
derive theoretical results showing the eﬀects of ad valorem and per unit 
taxes on average quality and quality premiums. In section 4 we present 
results from a numerical simulation using a three-commodity extension of 
the model (described in the appendix) applied to the Australian wine 
industry. 
3.1 Structure of the model and the general solution for two qualities 
Because the two qualities are related in consumption and production, the 
quantity demanded and supplied of each quality depends on its own price 
  
  
and the price of the other quality. Other demand and supply shifters, such as
 
income, demographic variables, and production technology, are treated as
 
ﬁxed in the analysis, and are therefore not included as arguments. The
 
demand and supply relationships can be written in general form as: 
CL ¼ CL PD L ; PD H 
  ð1Þ 
CH ¼ CHðPD L ; PD HÞ ð2Þ 
QL ¼ QLðPS L; PS HÞ ð3Þ 
QH ¼ QHðPS L; PS HÞ; ð4Þ 
where C denotes quantities consumed, Q denotes quantities produced, and 
P denotes prices. Subscripts L and H denote quantities and prices in the low-
and high-quality markets, and superscripts D and S denote prices along the 
demand and supply curves, respectively. The market-clearing conditions are: 
CL ¼ QL ð5Þ 
CH ¼ QH ð6Þ 
PD ¼ PS ð1 þ tLÞ ð7ÞL L
PD ¼ PS ð1 þ tHÞ; ð8ÞH H
where tL and tH are proportional taxes in the low- and high-quality markets, 
and are initially equal to zero. Increasing either ti term creates a wedge 
between the consumer price PD and the producer price PS in that market. i i 
Totally diﬀerentiating equations (1) through (8) and transforming the 
results yields: 
d ln CL ¼ gLLd ln PD þ gLHd ln PD ð9ÞL H 
d ln CH ¼ gHLd ln PD þ gHHd ln PD ð10ÞL H 
d ln QL ¼ LLd ln PS þ LHd ln PS ð11ÞL H 
d ln QH ¼ HLd ln PS þ HHd ln PS ð12ÞL H 
d ln CL ¼ d ln QL ð13Þ 
d ln CH ¼ d ln QH ð14Þ 
d ln PD ¼ d ln PS þ tL ð15ÞL L 
d ln PD ¼ d ln PS þ tH; ð16ÞH H 
where d ln X  dX=X denotes a proportional change in the variable X. For 
instance, d ln QL  dQL =QL is the proportional change in the quantity 
produced of the low-quality product. Coeﬃcients on the d ln Pi terms are 
elasticities: gij is the elasticity of demand for quality i with respect to the price 
of quality j, and ij is the elasticity of supply of quality i with respect to the 
 
  
price of quality j.3 Equations (9) through (16) implicitly deﬁne the eight endo­
genous variables (the proportional changes in quantities demanded and 
supplied and the proportional changes in consumer and producer prices in each 
of the two markets) as functions of the two exogenous tax rates, tL and tH. 
Imposing the market-clearing conditions in equations (13) and (14), the 
proportional quantity changes may be represented by the d ln Qi terms alone, 
and the remaining six equations may be speciﬁed in matrix notation as: 323232 
1 0  0 0 d ln QL 0gLL gLH 6666664
 
0 1 
  gHL gHH 0 0
 
1 0  0  0  LL LH 
0 1  0  0  HL HH 
0 0  1  0  1 0 
6666664 
7777775 
d ln QH 
d ln PDL 
d ln PD H 
d ln PSL 
7777775
 
¼
 
6666664
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
tL 
7777775
 
; ð17Þ
 
0 0 0  1 0  1 d ln PHS tH 
or Ay ¼ x. Inverting the coeﬃcient matrix, A, and pre-multiplying both sides 
of equation (17) by the inverse, A1, yields an explicit expression of the 
endogenous variables as functions of the elasticities and exogenous tax rates, 
i.e., y ¼ A1 x. The solution for the endogenous variables is: 3232 
dlnQL gLLðLLHH LHHLÞLLðgLLgHH gLHgHLÞ 666666664
 
dlnQH 
dlnPDL 
dlnPD H 
dlnPSL 
777777775
 
1
 
D
 
666666664
 
gHLðLLHH LHHLÞHLðgLLgHH gLHgHLÞ 
LLðHH gHHÞþHLðgLH LHÞ 
gHLLL gLLHL 
gLLðHH gHHÞþgHLðgLH LHÞ 
gHLLL gLLHL 
777777775
 
¼
 tL 
dlnPS H 32 
666666664
 
gLHðLLHH LHHLÞLHðgLLgHH gLHgHLÞ 
gHHðLLHH LHHLÞHHðgLLgHH gLHgHLÞ 
gLHHH gHHLH 
HHðLL gLLÞþLHðgHL HLÞ
 
gLHHH gHHLH
 
gHHðLL gLLÞþgLHðgHL HLÞ
 
777777775
 
1
 þ
 
D
 
tH 
ð18Þ
 
where: 
D ¼ ðLL  gLLÞðHH  gHHÞ  ðgLH  LHÞðgHL  HLÞ: 
3 Equations (15) and (16) are derived by totally diﬀerentiating the market-clearing condition 
for the price of each quality and dividing each side of the expression by the consumer price, 
noting that PD ¼ P iS ð1 þ tiÞ, dð1 þ tiÞ ¼  dti, and that dti ¼ ti (because the initial tax rate is i 
zero). 
  
  
The sign and size of the proportional change for each endogenous 
variable in equation (18) is determined by the signs, and in some cases the 
magnitudes, of the supply and demand elasticities, most of which cannot be 
determined in a strictly theoretical approach. In addition, it is not clear 
how to link these general results from this two-market speciﬁcation of a 
diﬀerentiated good with those from a single-market representation of an 
homogeneous good. This link is made by assuming that the low- and high-
quality goods comprise a weakly separable group, and that all other goods 
comprise another weakly separable group and may be aggregated into a 
composite commodity. 
3.2 Elasticity decompositions under the assumption of weak separability 
A group of goods is weakly separable if the marginal rates of substitution 
among commodities in that group are independent of the individual prices 
and quantities of goods not in the group. Imposing this assumption allows 
for the expression of the elasticities of demand and supply for low- and high-
quality varieties as functions of fundamental demand and supply parameters. 
This approach is often associated with Armington (1969), because he used a 
special case of the weak separability assumption in his model of demand for 
goods distinguished by their country of origin. Muth (1966) provided an 
earlier justiﬁcation for invoking the assumption, using a model of household 
production. 
If two groups of goods are weakly separable and if the price indexes 
used for the two groups of commodities are invariant to income, then the 
consumer’s budgeting process may be represented in two stages. In the 
ﬁrst stage, total expenditure is allocated between the two groups, 
depending on the group price indexes. In the second stage, the expenditure 
for each group is allocated among the individual commodities in that 
group. Many of the results derived below are discussed in terms of the 
ﬁrst- and second-stage eﬀects of price changes, although the suﬃcient 
conditions for two-stage budgeting are stronger than those necessary for 
the elasticity decompositions used here (see Edgerton 1997 for derivations 
and discussion).4 
Under the assumption that low- and high-quality varieties comprise a 
weakly separable group, the elasticities of demand for the individual 
4 Carpentier and Guyomard (2001) note that these elasticity decompositions violate sym­
metry of the Slutsky substitution matrix, except in the special case of homothetic separability. 
While we expect Slutsky symmetry to hold at the level of the individual consumer or ﬁrm, it 
need not hold at the market level (nor should we expect it to do so, unless we adhere strictly to 
the representative consumer hypothesis). 
 
  
commodities with respect to the individual prices can be expressed as: 
ð19ÞgLL ¼ sLcLg  sHr 
ð20ÞgLH ¼ sHðcLg þ rÞ 
gHL ¼ sLðcHg þ rÞ ð21Þ 
ð22ÞgHH ¼ sHcHg  sLr; 
where si is the budget share of quality i (i.e., si ¼ ðPiQiÞ=PQ, where the 
absence of subscripts denotes aggregate price or quantity). First-stage eﬀects 
are represented by g, the overall elasticity of demand, or the elasticity of 
demand for the aggregate quantity with respect to the aggregate price 
ðg < 0Þ. There are two second-stage eﬀects. The second-stage substitution 
eﬀect is determined by r, the elasticity of substitution between low- and high-
quality commodities ðr > 0Þ. The second-stage expansion eﬀects are deter­
mined by the ci terms, where ci is the elasticity of demand for quality i with 
respect to group expenditure ðci > 0Þ. 
Elasticities of supply of the individual commodities with respect to 
individual prices can be expressed similarly, as: 
LL ¼ sLqL sHs ð23Þ 
LH ¼ sHðqLþ sÞ ð24Þ 
HL ¼ sLðqHþ sÞ ð25Þ 
HH ¼ sHqH sLs; ð26Þ 
where  is the overall elasticity of supply with respect to the group price index, 
and represents the ﬁrst-stage eﬀect ð > 0Þ. The second-stage substitution 
eﬀect is determined by s, the elasticity of transformation between low-quality 
and high-quality varieties in the production process ðs < 0Þ, and qi is an 
expansion elasticity, and determines the second-stage expansion eﬀect ðqi > 0Þ. 
One advantage of using these decompositions instead of the general 
elasticities is that the number of parameters is reduced, and all of the 
parameters are of known sign. The eight elasticities are replaced by seven 
underlying parameters: g; ;r; s; cH , qH , and sH , noting that sL þ sH ¼ 1, 
sLcL þ sH cH ¼ 1, and sLqL þ sH qH ¼ 1. Another important advantage is that 
the elasticity decompositions nest two special cases. The ﬁrst is the case of 
homothetic separability, used in Armington (1969) trade models.5 In addition 
to the assumptions imposed by weak separability, homothetic separability 
restricts the elasticities of demand with respect to changes in group 
5 These models have been used extensively in models of trade in agricultural commodities. 
An early and notable example is the analysis of the international wheat market by Grennes et al. 
(1978). Also, see Johnson (1971), Alston (1986), Alston et al. (1990), MacLaren (1990), Davis 
and Kruse (1993), and Sumner et al. (1994) for discussions of the Armington model, speciﬁc 
studies, and related econometric issues. 
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expenditure, and the expansion elasticities of supply, to be equal to one for both 
qualities (i.e., cL ¼ cH ¼ qL ¼ qH ¼ 1) such that the quantities consumed of the 
diﬀerent qualities change by the same proportion, unless their relative prices 
change; similarly for quantities produced. These additional restrictions 
eliminate the second-stage expansion eﬀects from the elasticity terms. 
The second special case is that of product homogeneity. If, in addition to 
eliminating the second-stage expansion eﬀects as in the case of homothetic 
separability, the second-stage substitution eﬀects are also eliminated from the 
elasticity terms, then only the ﬁrst-stage eﬀects remain. These ﬁrst-stage eﬀects 
represent changes in aggregate prices and quantities that would be predicted 
froma model ofan homogeneous good,without regardfor howthe composition 
of the aggregate might change. Estimated policy outcomes under the assump­
tion of product homogeneity are thus found by evaluating the more general 
price and quantity eﬀects under the assumptions that the expenditure and 
expansion elasticities of the two qualities are equal to one (as in the Armington 
case), and that there is no substitution between qualities (i.e., r ¼ s ¼ 0). This 
special case will be used as a basis for determining the errors in the estimated 
policy eﬀects caused by ignoring quality responses to those policies. 
3.3 Price and quantity eﬀects of ad valorem and per unit taxes 
After substituting the expressions in equations (19) through (26) into 
equation (18), the solution for changes in prices and quantities in response to 
the introduction of taxes can be written as: 323232 
d ln QL g sHrs 666666664
 
d ln QH 
d ln PDL 
d ln PD H 
d ln PSL 
777777775
 
¼
 
666666664
 
g 
g 
777777775
 
ðsLtL þ sHtHÞ 
  g þ
 
666666664
 
sLrs 
sHs 
sLs 
sHr 
777777775
 
ðtL  tHÞ 
r  s 
d ln PS g sLrH 
32
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ} |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
first-stage effects second-stage substitution effects 
þ
 
666666664
 
sH½rðqL  qHÞ þ sðcH  cLÞ 
sL½rðqL  qHÞ þ sðcH  cLÞ 
 sH ðcH  qHÞ sL 
777777775
 
gðsLtL þ sHtHÞ 
ð  gÞðr  sÞ ð27Þ
 ðcH  qHÞ 
 sH ðcH  qHÞ sL 
ðcH  qHÞ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
second-stage expansion effects 
  
  
The ﬁrst element of the solution, the ﬁrst-stage eﬀects, shows the price and 
quantity eﬀects that would be predicted from a single-market model of an 
homogeneous good, in which the tax rate is a value-share weighted sum of 
the individual tax rates. The second element of the solution represents the 
substitution eﬀects from the second stage of the budgeting process, in which 
expenditure is allocated between the diﬀerent qualities of the good. The ﬁrst 
two terms combined comprise the solutions under the Armington assumption 
of homothetic separability. Finally, the third element in the solution 
represents terms that adjust the Armington solutions for the diﬀerent 
expansion eﬀects in the low- and high-quality markets. The solution in 
equation (27) holds for both ad valorem and per-unit tax policies, but the 
speciﬁc results vary because the diﬀerent types of taxes have diﬀerent 
implications for the tax-rate parameters, tL and tH . The signs of the ﬁrst- and 
second-stage eﬀects (when known) for the ad valorem and per-unit tax 
policies are summarised in table 1. 
Consider ﬁrst a uniform ad valorem tax policy, where a 100t per cent tax 
is imposed on both qualities. In this case, tL ¼ tH ¼ t, which means the 
second-stage substitution eﬀects vanish, and the second-stage expansion 
eﬀects alone represent the error from assuming product homogeneity. When 
the expansion elasticities of the two qualities are equal, the second-stage 
expansion eﬀects also vanish, and there is no error from using a model of an 
homogeneous good to estimate the eﬀects of an ad valorem tax. However, 
when the two qualities comprise a weakly separable but not a homothet­
ically separable group, the second-stage expansion eﬀects adjust the 
predicted eﬀects from the single-market model. The signs of the second-
stage expansion eﬀects depend on the relative sizes of the expansion 
elasticities, which are not known for this general case. However, for typical 
goods, such as wine, it seems likely that the expenditure elasticity of demand 
Table 1 Directions of eﬀects on endogenous variables from ad valorem and per-unit taxes 
Second-stage Second-stage expansion 
substitution eﬀects eﬀects (both policies) 
First-stage 
eﬀects Ad valorem Per-unit 
Variable (both policies) tax tax cH > qH cH < qH 
QL  0  ? ? 
QH  0 þ ? ? 
PD þ 0 þ þ L 
PD þ 0   þH 
PS  0  þ L 
PS  0 þ  þH 
Note: ‘?’ indicates that the direction of the eﬀect is unknown. 
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for the high-quality variety will be larger than that of the low-quality 
variety, so that cH > 1 and cL < 1 (a higher income elasticity of demand for 
higher quality), while the relationship on the supply side seems likely to be 
the converse, qH < 1 and qL > 1 (it is relatively diﬃcult to expand 
production of higher quality). These conditions imply that cH > qH , which 
implies that the price eﬀects will be more pronounced in the market where 
the expansion eﬀect is smaller: the expansion eﬀects accentuate the 
consumer price increase for the low-quality good and the producer price 
decrease for the high-quality good. 
Next, consider the eﬀects of a uniform tax of T per unit. The initial 
quality-speciﬁc prices are used to convert the tax to proportional terms, and 
the two tax rates are speciﬁed as tL ¼ T =PL and tH ¼ T =PH , where PL 
and PH are the initial prices, and PD ¼ PS at the initial equilibrium,i i 
so the superscripts may be dropped. The algebra for the eﬀects of this 
tax policy can be condensed somewhat by deﬁning P as the average unit 
value of the total quantity at the initial equilibrium, i.e., P ¼ ðPLQL þ
PHQH Þ=ðQL þ QH Þ, which implies that sLtL þ sH tH ¼ T =P and tL  tH ¼ 
ðPH  PLÞT =PLPH . Further, prices of individual qualities relative to the 
~P i ¼ P i=P . 
eﬀects of the per-unit tax policy can be written as: 
average unit value are deﬁned
 Using these deﬁnitions, the
as
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second-stage expansion effects 
The ﬁrst-stage eﬀects in equation (28) are equivalent to the changes in 
prices and quantities that would be estimated using a single-market model 
for a per-unit tax of T and an initial price of P . In contrast to the ad valorem 
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tax, the second-stage substitution eﬀects are no longer equal to zero, because 
the proportional tax rates diﬀer. By deﬁnition, the price of the high-quality 
good is larger than that of the low-quality good, and all of the other elements 
in the second set of terms are of known sign. As shown in the third column 
of table 1, the second-stage substitution eﬀects mean that the quantity 
reduction in the low-quality market is greater and the quantity reduction in 
the high-quality market is smaller than those predicted in a single-market 
model of a per unit tax applied to an homogeneous good. Finally, the terms 
representing the second-stage expansion eﬀect take the same signs as they did 
for the ad valorem tax, for the same relative parameter values. 
3.4 Quality eﬀects of ad valorem and per unit tax policies 
The use of a single-market model to represent an aggregate of various 
qualities implicitly assumes that the policy impacts will be the same for all 
qualities, so that the average quality of the aggregate is constant. Deﬁning 
average quality as QH =QL, the proportional change in average quality 
resulting from the tax policy is measured as the diﬀerence between the 
proportional quantity changes, d ln QH  d ln QL.6 Similarly, consumer and 
producer price premiums for high quality can be expressed as the ratio of the 
price of the high-quality product to the price of the low-quality product (i.e., 
P DH =P
D and PSH =P L
S, respectively). Thus, the proportional changes in the price L 
premiums will equal the diﬀerence between the proportional price changes 
for the individual goods, d ln P iH  d ln P iL, for i ¼ D; S. The degree to which 
these measures diﬀer from zero is a further indication of the errors caused by 
assuming product homogeneity. 
The proportional changes in average quality and the price premiums for 
either tax policy are given by: 
QH rs d ln ¼   ðtL  tHÞ 
QL r  s 
g½rðqL  qHÞ þ sðcH  cLÞ  ðsLtL þ sHtHÞ ð29Þ ð  gÞðr  sÞ 
PD s gðcH  qHÞHd ln ¼ ðtL  tHÞ þ  ðsLtL þ sHtHÞ ð30Þ 
PD r  s sLð  gÞðr  sÞL 
PS r gðcH  qHÞHd ln ¼ ðtL  tHÞ þ  ðsLtL þ sHtHÞ: ð31Þ 
PS r  s sLð  gÞðr  sÞL 
6 Average quality could be deﬁned in a number of ways. The deﬁnition used here is 
particularly convenient. 
 
  
The directions and magnitudes of each of these changes hinge on the second-
stage eﬀects in equation (27). The ﬁrst terms in equations (29) through (31) 
measure the diﬀerences between the substitution eﬀects in the low- and high-
quality markets, and the second terms measure the diﬀerences between the 
expansion eﬀects in the two markets. 
For a uniform ad valorem tax, there are no substitution eﬀects in either 
market, so the ﬁrst terms in equations (29) through (31) are eliminated. 
When the Armington assumptions are appropriate, the second terms equal 
zero as well; average quality and both the consumer and the producer 
quality premiums remain constant, as would be implicitly predicted from a 
single-market model of an homogeneous product. However, these changes 
will not equal zero under the assumption of (nonhomothetic) weak 
separability, even for the case of an uniform ad valorem tax. This is a 
somewhat unexpected result: even an ad valorem tax can distort relative 
prices and the incentives to produce and consume quality when the more 
general (and more realistic) supply and demand relationships are incorpor­
ated in the analysis. These quality eﬀects are summarised in the upper panel 
of table 2. 
For the case of a weakly separable group of goods, when cH > qH (where 
the expansion eﬀects for the higher-quality good on the demand side exceed 
those on the supply side), the quality premiums for consumers and producers 
both decrease as a result of the tax policy (column three of table 2). This 
would create an incentive for consumers to increase the quality of their 
consumption, and for producers to decrease the quality of their production. 
The direction of the eﬀect on average quality, which must be the same for 
both consumers and producers, is indeterminant. It depends on the relative 
expansion eﬀects between the low- and high-quality commodities for 
Table 2 Quality eﬀects of ad valorem and per-unit taxes 
Quality variable 
Homogeneous 
product 
Homothetic 
separability 
Weak separability 
cH > qH cH < qH 
Ad valorem tax 
QH =QL 
PD H =P 
D 
L 
PS H =P 
S 
L 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
? 
 
 
? 
+ 
+ 
Per-unit tax 
QH =QL 
PD H =P 
D 
L 
PS H =P 
S 
L 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
 
+ 
? 
  
? 
? 
? 
++  
Note: ‘‘++’’ (‘‘’’) indicates a larger increase (decrease) relative to ‘‘+’’ (‘‘’’), ‘?’ indicates that the 
direction of the eﬀect is unknown. 
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consumers and for producers, and on the relative diﬀerences in the expansion 
eﬀects between consumers and producers for each quality. 
For a per-unit tax, the quality eﬀects are: 
ðPH  PLÞ 
PLPH 
ðPH  PLÞ
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The directions of these quality eﬀects are shown in the lower panel of table 2. 
Unlike the ad valorem tax, under the assumption of homothetic separability, a 
per-unit tax has unambiguous quality eﬀects unless both r and s are equal to 
zero. As long as there are some substitution possibilities in both consumption 
and production, and r and s take on their normal signs (i.e., r > 0, s < 0), the 
proportional quantity reduction in the high-quality market will be smaller than 
that in the low-quality market, and average quality will increase as a result of 
the tax. The consumer’s quality premium decreases, and the producer’s quality 
premium increases. These eﬀects are intuitive. If average quality increases as a 
result of the tax, consumers require an incentive to consume higher quality: a 
lower quality premium. Similarly, producers require an incentive to produce 
higher quality: a higher quality premium. 
The results for the case of homothetic separability oﬀer proof of the Alchian-
Allen theorem at the market level. However, this ‘proof’ must be qualiﬁed, as it 
relies on the assumption of homothetic separability; results are ambiguous in a 
more general setting. As noted by Gould and Segall (1969) and Borcherding 
and Silberberg (1978) for the individual consumer problem, the Alchian-Allen 
eﬀect is unambiguous only in a two-good world with no income eﬀects. 
Similarly, at the market level, the assumption of homotheticity in eﬀect restricts 
the roles that income and third goods can play, as they enter the conditional 
demand functions through the expenditure term. The quality eﬀects in the 
more-general setting, when the assumption of homotheticity is relaxed, are 
shown in the third column of table 2 for the case where cH > qH , and in the 
fourth column for the less-likely case where cH < qH . Under the more-general 
assumption of (nonhomothetic) weak separability, only one of the three quality 
eﬀects can be determined unambiguously. 
4. Taxes on Australian wine 
Prior to June 2000, Australian wine was subject to a 41 per cent wholesale 
tax. With the introduction of the 10 per cent GST, the previous tax policy 
  
  
was also reformed such that the combined set of changes would be tax-
revenue neutral. There was some debate about whether the new wholesale tax 
should be speciﬁed on a per-unit or ad valorem basis (Wittwer and Anderson 
1998 and 2002; Berger and Anderson 1999). In discussions of the relative 
merits of the diﬀerent tax policies, the eﬀects on producers and consumers of 
diﬀerent qualities of wine were often mentioned. Alchian-Allen type 
arguments were made, suggesting that costs from a per-unit tax would be 
relatively higher for producers and consumers of low-quality wine, and thus 
would favour high-quality producers (Berger and Anderson 1999). The 
analysis presented here serves to evaluate whether such statements, based on 
intuition about individual consumer and producer optimisation, are true at 
the market level, and to quantify the extent to which price, quantity, and 
welfare impacts diﬀer among the markets for lower-quality (cask) and 
premium wines. 
In our model of the market for Australian wine, wine is aggregated into 
three groups: cask, premium white, and premium red.7 This representation 
aggregates wine that is certainly heterogeneous into each of the three 
composites, but this aggregation is justiﬁed on at least three grounds. First, it 
is more accurate than treating all wine as a single aggregate. Second, it allows 
us to check our intuition about how the responses to taxes may diﬀer among 
a few classes of wine, whereas including more detail would tend to make the 
results diﬃcult to decipher. Third, it is a level of disaggregation for which 
price and quantity data are available. 
The particular representation of the wine market is stylized, and it 
abstracts from a number of details that might be important if the analysis 
were to be used for policy prescription rather than illustration. The model 
does not distinguish between wholesale and retail markets for wine, which 
would be important for purposes of prescribing policy (i.e., ﬁnding the 
revenue-neutral pre- and post-GST tax rates, as done by Wittwer and 
Anderson 1998 and 2002) because pre-2000 taxes were all imposed at the 
wholesale level, while the new GST is a retail tax. The wholesale-retail 
distinction could be incorporated by specifying a mark-up pricing rule, but 
that would be an unhelpful complication for the present purpose. A further 
simpliﬁcation in the model is that it does not explicitly incorporate 
international trade. Export demand is included implicitly by specifying the 
total demand for Australian wine in each quality category. A more realistic 
model might have diﬀerential tax rates applied to exports versus domestic 
consumption. This would mean that a tax policy change might give rise to 
7 How to disaggregate Australian wine is arbitrary, given the absence of any empirical 
evidence for particular separability assumptions. Ultimately, the decision is governed by the 
availability of data. We have used the same categories as Wittwer and Anderson (2001), from 
whom we obtained the data. 
  
  
diﬀerences in the mixes of quality produced, consumed, and traded. While 
foreign wine imported into Australia is omitted, imported wine accounts for 
a small share of wine consumed domestically, and any errors caused by 
omitting wine imports are expected to be small. 
The general structure of the three-quality model is similar to that of the 
two-quality model described in section 3.1, and the full details are provided in 
the appendix. Demand and supply of each quality depend on all of the 
quality-speciﬁc prices. Taxes are represented as diﬀerences between consumer 
and producer prices, and the proportional changes in the quality-speciﬁc 
prices and quantities are expressed as functions of the exogenous, quality-
speciﬁc tax rates. As for the two-quality case, an assumption of weak 
separability is imposed to simplify the results. In particular, cask and 
premium wine are assumed to comprise a weakly separable group, and then 
red and white premium wines are assumed to be weakly separable from cask 
wine. This separability structure adds an additional stage to the budgeting 
process, in which the expenditure on production and consumption of 
premium wine is allocated between red and white. In this additional stage, 
total response to price changes includes both substitution and expansion 
eﬀects, much like the second-stage eﬀects described earlier. The model is 
structured such that the two-quality model is a special case in which there are 
no substitution possibilities between red and white premium wines, and their 
expansion eﬀects are equal. The extension of the model from two to three 
qualities illustrates how this type of approach to modelling quality can be 
applied to cases with more than three qualities, or with diﬀerent separability 
structures. 
4.1 Price, quantity, and quality eﬀects of alternative wine taxes 
The model of the three qualities of wine described earlier (and in the 
appendix) is speciﬁed using price and quantity data for 1999, shown in 
table 3. While several studies of the demand for wine in diﬀerent countries 
have been conducted (see Larivie` re et al. 2000 for a review), very few have 
focused on demand for Australian wine. Abdalla and Duﬀus (1988) 
estimated the demand for cask and premium wines, and found own-price 
elasticities of 1:50 and 0:02, respectively (information obtained from 
Shepherd, O’Donnell and Abdalla 1999). Clements and Johnson (1983) 
estimated the aggregate demand for wine, and found an own-price elasticity 
of 0:43. Wittwer and Anderson (2002) note, however, that the parameter 
estimates of these studies may no longer apply, because of the subsequent 
expansion of the industry, particularly in the production and consumption of 
higher-quality wines. Estimates of supply elasticities are even more rare in 
the literature. 
 
  
Table 3 Prices and quantities of Australian wine, 1999 
Type of wine Retail price Quantitya Value share 
Cask 
Premiumb 
A$ per litre 
3.71 
12.28 
millions of litres 
270.6 
294.3 
proportion 
0.22 
0.78 
White 
Red 
11.46 
13.11 
148.2 
146.1 
0.37 (0.47 of premium) 
0.41 (0.53 of premium) 
Source: Wittwer and Anderson (2001).
 
Notes: a Quantities refer to quantities of Australian wine consumed in 1999, and include domestic and
 
foreign consumption.
 
b Price for the premium aggregate is deﬁned as the quantity-share weighted sum of the prices for premium
 
white and red wines. Quantity for the premium aggregate is deﬁned as the simple sum of the quantities of
 
premium white and red.
 
The approach taken here is a common one in studies of commodity 
markets and policies. A model is speciﬁed and parameterised based on 
consumption, production, and prices in a particular year (or a represen­
tative year), combined with a set of elasticities. In most cases, few if any of 
the elasticities are estimated directly within a policy study, and usually it is 
not possible (or sensible) simply to take elasticities from the literature. 
Instead, relevant elasticities are ‘guestimated’ using a combination of 
results in the literature, economic theory, and intuition. The problem of 
limited availability of speciﬁc elasticity estimates for parameterising a 
policy model becomes more serious as we move in the direction of using 
less aggregative models. That this is so can be seen in the studies by 
Wittwer and Anderson (1998, 2001 and 2002) that model the Australian 
wine market.8 While these studies use the same three categories of wine, 
our model is structured diﬀerently such that the speciﬁc elasticities refer to 
diﬀerent concepts (e.g., Hicksian versus Marshallian demand elasticities, 
domestic versus total demand, and possibly diﬀerent lengths of run); hence, 
the elasticities are not directly comparable. Even though they are not 
directly comparable without signiﬁcant eﬀort, we believe that the set of 
elasticities used here is broadly consistent with that used by Wittwer and 
Anderson (1998, 2001 and 2002), and neither set is clearly better or worse 
than the other.9 
Some economists appear to believe that econometrically estimated 
elasticities are intrinsically more accurate and otherwise superior to ‘calib­
rated’ or ‘guestimated’ elasticities of the sort typically used in applied policy 
8 See also Zhao, Anderson and Wittwer (2002). 
9 Wittwer and Anderson (1998, 2001 and 2002) also had to use a combination of economic 
theory and their own intuition to derive the elasticities they used. 
  
  
analysis, but econometric estimates have their own set of deﬁciencies – such 
as implausible magnitudes, wrong signs, and inconsistencies with theory. A 
virtue of the introspective approach to estimating elasticities is that at least 
these drawbacks can be avoided. In his discussion of ways in which noise 
aﬀects markets and colors our investigations of them, Fischer Black (1986) 
said ‘Sometimes I wonder if we can draw any conclusions at all from the 
results of regression studies … [The] slopes of demand and supply curves are 
so hard to estimate that they are essentially unobservable. Introspection 
seems as good a method as any in trying to estimate them’ (pp. 535–536). 
Even if we wished to estimate the supply and demand elasticities economet­
rically, suﬃcient data are simply not available for the quality categories of 
interest. We have to rely on a few estimates from the literature and 
introspection. 
While there is little empirical evidence to support any particular elasticity 
values, we do have some intuition about the relative values of certain 
parameters; and once some parameter values are speciﬁed, others are 
determined by theoretical restrictions. The values used for the underlying 
supply and demand parameters are shown in table 4, and the own- and cross-
price elasticities of demand and supply implied by the underlying parameter 
values and the value shares are shown in table 5. Demand is assumed to be 
more elastic than supply, in terms of the overall elasticities. The remaining 
parameter values were chosen to ensure that the diﬀerent qualities of wine 
were substitutes in demand and in supply, while imposing the adding-up 
conditions on the expansion elasticities. The elasticity of substitution in 
demand between cask and premium wines and that between red and white 
premium wines were both set equal to 3. On the supply side, cask and 
Table 4 Parameter values used for model of Australian wine taxes 
Demand parameters Supply parameters 
Eﬀect represented by parameter Symbol Value Symbol Value 
Stage 1 eﬀects 
Overall elasticity g 1:5  1.0 
Stage 2 eﬀects 
Substitution eﬀect 
Scale eﬀect – cask 
Scale eﬀect – premium 
r 
cL 
cH 
3.0 
0.3 
1.2 
s 
qL 
qH 
2:0 
1.7 
0.8 
Stage 3 eﬀects 
Substitution eﬀect 
Scale eﬀect – white premium 
Scale eﬀect – red premium 
rWR 
cW 
cR 
3.0 
0.8 
1.2 
sWR 
qW 
qR 
1:5 
1.0 
1.0 
  
  
Table 5 Demand and supply elasticities used in the model of Australian wine 
Elasticity with respect to the price of: 
Cask Premium white Premium red 
Elasticity of demand for: 
Cask 2:44 0.95 1.07 
Premium white 0.20 2:34 0.74 
Premium red 0.31 0.25 2:72 
Elasticity of supply of: 
Cask 1.94 0:10 0:12 
Premium white 0:26 1.29 0:23 
Premium red 0:26 0:21 1.27 
premium wines were assumed to be more easily transformed from one to the 
other (by altering production practices) than are red and white premium 
wines (because such a transformation would require grafting or replanting a 
vineyard). 
Elasticities of demand with respect to expenditure are assumed to be larger 
for higher-priced categories of wine. The expenditure elasticity of premium 
wine was set equal to 1.2, and the cask-wine elasticity was recovered using the 
adding-up condition: sLcL þ sH cH ¼ 1. Similarly, the elasticity of demand for 
premium red wine with respect to expenditure on premium wine was set equal 
to 1.2, and the expenditure elasticity for premium white wine was recovered 
using a similarly deﬁned adding-up condition. On the supply side, expansion 
of high-quality wine was assumed to be less elastic (owing to more limiting 
specialised factors, such as land and management), and so the expansion 
elasticity for cask wine is larger than that of premium wine. The expansion 
elasticity of premium wine was set equal to 0.8, and the corresponding 
elasticity for cask wines was recovered using the adding-up condition. The 
expansion elasticities of supply are assumed to be equal to one for both red 
and white premium wines. 
The own- and cross-price elasticities derived from these values, shown in 
table 5, have signs (and magnitudes) that are consistent with our intuition. 
Own-price elasticities of demand are all negative, and are larger for the 
premium wines then for cask wines. Cross-price elasticities are all positive, 
indicating that the wines are gross substitutes, and demand for cask wine is 
more responsive to changes in the prices of premium wines than the converse. 
Own-price elasticities of supply are all positive, and larger for cask wine than 
for premium wines. Cross-price elasticities of supply are all negative, 
indicating that the wines are substitutes. The analytical solution in the 
appendix can be used to see how the results might diﬀer for a diﬀerent set of 
parameter values. 
  
  
Table 6 Price and quantity eﬀects of ad valorem and per litre wine taxes, decomposed into 
ﬁrst-, second-, and third-stage eﬀects 
Second-stage eﬀects Third-stage eﬀects 
First-stage Total 
Variable eﬀect Subst. Expan. Subst. Expan. eﬀect 
percentage change 
10 per cent Ad Valorem Tax 
QL 6:00 0.00 0:86 0.00 0.00 6:86 
QW 6:00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.43 5:33 
QR 6:00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0:38 6:14 
P D L 4.00 0.00 1.73 0.00 0.00 5.73 
P D W 4.00 0.00 0:48 0.00 0.29 3.81 
P D R 4.00 0.00 0:48 0.00 0:26 3.26 
P S L 6:00 0.00 1.73 0.00 0.00 4:27 
P S W 6:00 0.00 0:48 0.00 0.29 6:19 
P S R 6:00 0.00 0:48 0.00 0:26 6:74 
percentage change 
$0.91 Per Litre Tax 
QL 6:70 16:12 0:96 0.00 0.00 23:78 
QW 6:70 4.48 0.27 0:53 0.15 2:34 
QR 6:70 4.48 0.27 0.47 0:13 1:61 
P D L 4.46 5.37 1.93 0.00 0.00 11.77 
P D W 4.46 1:49 0:54 0.18 0.10 2.71 
P D R 4.46 1:49 0:54 0:16 0:09 2.19 
P S L 6:70 8:06 1.93 0.00 0.00 12:83 
P S W 6:70 2.24 0:54 0:35 0.10 5:25 
P S R 6:70 2.24 0:54 0.31 0:09 4:77 
The upper panel of table 6 shows the percentage change in the quantity, 
consumer price, and producer price of each quality of wine for a 10 per cent 
ad valorem tax. The values of the ﬁrst-, second-, and third-stage eﬀects are 
shown, as well as the net eﬀects (in the last column). It is clear that, even 
when there are no substitution eﬀects, the expansion eﬀects cause the changes 
in price and quantity to diﬀer among the various qualities. Using a model of 
an homogeneous good as an approximation, or relying on intuition from 
individual consumer or producer problems, one would expect each of the 
price and quantity eﬀects to be the same for all three qualities, which is 
clearly not the case. 
Eﬀects of a per-litre tax that would generate the same tax revenue as the 
10 per cent ad valorem tax are shown in the lower panel of table 6. The tax of 
$0.91 per litre was found by equating tax revenue from the 10 per cent 
ad valorem tax to that of the per-litre tax, using the model of three qualities 
of wine. The diﬀerences among the eﬀects in the three markets are revealed 
in the last column, and are much more pronounced than they were for the 
  
  
Table 7 Quality eﬀects of ad valorem and per litre wine taxes 
Quality measurea 10 per cent ad valorem $0.91 per litre 
Average quality 
White 
Red 
percentage change 
1.54 
0.72 
21.44 
22.17 
Consumer quality premium 
White 
Red 
1:92 
2:46 
9:05 
9:57 
Producer quality premium 
White 
Red 
1:92 
2:46 
7.58 
8.06 
a Each quality eﬀect is calculated assuming that proportional changes in quantities and prices are equal for 
white and red cask wines. 
ad valorem tax. The proportional decrease in the quantity of cask wine is 
roughly ten times those of the premium wines. Diﬀerences in the propor­
tional changes in consumer and producer prices are also large, with the 
consumer price of cask wine increasing by about 12 per cent, and the 
consumer prices of white and red premium wines increasing by approxi­
mately 2 and 3 per cent, respectively. The diﬀerences in the price and quantity 
outcomes among the three markets are driven by the second- and third-stage 
eﬀects, particularly the second-stage substitution eﬀects. 
The quality eﬀects of the two taxes are summarised in table 7, which shows 
the percentage change in average quality and the consumer and producer 
quality premiums, for white and red wines. These quality eﬀects are 
calculated assuming that proportional eﬀects on white and red cask wines 
are equal, and using expressions similar to equations (29) through (34). For 
the ad valorem tax, average qualities of white and red wines increase 
somewhat, but the increases in average quality are much more pronounced 
for the revenue-neutral per-unit tax (both increasing by over 20 per cent). For 
both tax policies and both red and white wines, consumer quality premiums 
decrease, although these decreases are larger for the per-unit tax policy. 
Finally, producer quality premiums for both red and white wines decrease for 
the ad valorem tax, but increase for the per unit tax. 
Table 8 shows the tax revenue collected in each market from each tax 
policy, in millions of dollars and as a percentage of the total tax revenue 
collected. For the ad valorem tax, the tax burden is relatively higher in the 
premium wine markets than in the cask-wine market, with only 22 per cent 
of the tax revenue collected on cask wine sales. In contrast, for the per-litre 
tax, the tax burden is relatively higher in the cask-wine market, with 
  
  
Table 8 Tax revenue collected from ad valorem and per-litre wine taxes 
10 per cent ad valorem tax $0.91 per-litre tax 
share of tax revenue share of tax 
Market $ million (per cent) $ million revenue (per cent) 
Cask 98.86 21.90 188.19 41.69 
White 166.91 36.98 132.06 29.26 
Red 185.64 41.12 131.16 29.06 
Total 451.41 100.00 451.41 100.00 
42 per cent of the tax revenue collected. Thus, although the two tax policies 
generate the same amount of tax revenue, the incidence of the costs diﬀers 
substantially between the two policies. 
5. Concluding remarks 
While the assumption of product homogeneity is convenient, it is important 
to recognise that it may not always be appropriate. The analytical results 
presented here indicate that tax policies may induce distortions in the 
quality mix of units sold and in quality premiums. Under the assumption of 
homothetic separability, eﬀects of taxes are very similar to the Alchian-
Allen eﬀects discussed in the literature in the context of individual 
consumer behaviour: an ad valorem tax leaves average quality and quality 
premiums unchanged, while a per unit tax increases average quality, 
decreases the consumer quality premium, and increases the producer quality 
premium. 
In contrast, when we allow for more general demand and supply 
conditions, market-level eﬀects of taxes are not entirely consistent with our 
expectations, based on intuition about individual behaviour from Alchian 
and Allen (1964). When the qualities of interest comprise a (nonhomothetic) 
weakly separable group, even an ad valorem tax can distort quality. Because 
the quality eﬀects are second-order eﬀects, they will not always be 
important. When the quality eﬀects are small, a single-market model for 
an aggregate good may reasonably approximate the actual policy eﬀects in 
the markets for heterogeneous products. However, the larger are those 
quality eﬀects, the less accurate will be the results from a model of an 
homogeneous good. Relatively large quality eﬀects mean that the errors 
from using an model of an homogeneous good to estimate policy impacts 
would be large as well. 
Results from the analytical model demonstrate which parameters are 
important in determining the direction and magnitude of the errors caused by 
  
  
ignoring quality variation. In general, the errors from assuming product 
homogeneity increase as the degree of substitutability between qualities (in 
consumption or production) increases, as the diﬀerence in prices of high and 
low qualities increases, and as the size of the tax increases. Diﬀerences in the 
expansion eﬀects between qualities also inﬂuence the errors from incorrectly 
assuming product homogeneity. An empirical analysis using price and 
quantity data and reasonable parameter values to represent the Australian 
wine market indicated that per unit taxes would have substantial eﬀects on 
average quality and quality premiums, which diﬀered signiﬁcantly from those 
of ad valorem taxes. Hence, ad valorem and per unit tax policies that are 
equivalent in terms of tax revenue collected have very diﬀerent implications 
for how the costs of the policies are distributed among producers and 
consumers of diﬀerent qualities. 
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Appendix 
A three-quality model of the Australian wine market 
The three-quality model is structured as above for two qualities, where 
demand for and supply of each quality of wine are functions of the prices of 
all three qualities, or: 
Ci ¼ CiðPDL ; PD ÞW; PD ð35ÞR
Qi ¼ QiðPSL; PS RÞ;W; PS ð36Þ 
for i ¼ L; W; and R, where subscript L refers to cask wine (including both 
white and red), and subscripts W and R denote premium white and premium 
red wines, respectively. Equilibrium conditions are speciﬁed for each of the 
three markets, as: 
Ci ¼ Qi ð37Þ 
PD i ¼ PS i ð1 þ tiÞ: ð38Þ 
These supply and demand functions and equilibrium conditions can be 
totally diﬀerentiated and transformed to logarithmic diﬀerential form, so 
that the nine endogenous variables (quantity, consumer price, and producer 
  
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
price for each of the three qualities) are implicitly deﬁned as functions of 
parameters and the three tax rates. In matrix notation: 323232 
1 0 0  0 0 0 d lnQL 0gLL gLW gLR 
0 1 0 
  gWL gWW gWR 0 0 0
 d ln QW 7777777777775 
: 
0 0 0 0  0  1 0 0  1 d lnPS tRR 
ð39Þ 
The general solution for the endogenous variables can be found by pre-
multiplying each side of equation (39) by the inverse of the left-hand side 
matrix. 
Cask and premium wines are assumed to comprise a weakly separable 
group and, within that group, red and white premium wines are assumed to 
comprise another weakly separable group (i.e., the marginal rate of 
substitution between red and white premium wines is independent of the 
consumption of cask wine). This additional separability assumption adds a 
third stage to the budgeting process, in which expenditure on premium wine is 
allocated between red and white wines. Accordingly, the elasticities of demand 
and supply for each of the premium wines include third-stage substitution 
and expansion eﬀects in addition to the ﬁrst- and second-stage eﬀects. 
The elasticities of demand for the diﬀerent qualities of wine with respect to 
individual price changes are: 
ð40ÞgLL ¼ sLcLg  sHr 
ð41ÞgLj ¼ sjðcLg þ rÞ 
ð42ÞgjL ¼ sLcjðcHg þ rÞ 
gij ¼ sðHÞj½ciðsHcHg  sLrÞ þ rWR for i 6 ð43Þ¼ j 
sHcHg  sLrÞ  ð1  sðHÞiÞ ð44Þgii ¼ sðHÞicið rWR 
for i, j ¼ W, R, where sðHÞW is the expenditure on white premium wine as a 
share of total expenditure on premium wine (i.e., sðHÞW ¼ ðPWQWÞ=ðPHQHÞ), 
and sðHÞR is deﬁned similarly. In addition, ci for i ¼ W; R is the elasticity of 
demand for the ith wine with respect to expenditure on premium wine, and 
rWR > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between white and red premium 
wines. All other parameters are deﬁned as in the two-quality case. The 
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 d ln QR 
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 tL 
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elasticities of supply for the individual qualities with respect to changes in 
price are: 
LL ¼ sLqL  sHs ð45Þ 
Lj ¼ sjðqL þ sÞ 
jL ¼ sLqjðqH þ sÞ 
ð46Þ 
ð47Þ 
ij ¼ sðHÞj qiðsHqH  sLsÞ þ sWR½  for i 6¼ j ð48Þ 
ii ¼ sðHÞiqiðsHqH  sLsÞ  ð1  sðHÞiÞsWR ð49Þ 
for i, j ¼ W, R, where qi represents the third-stage expansion eﬀect in either the 
premium white or premium red market, and sWR < 0 is the elasticity of 
transformation between white and red premium wines. 
The analytical solution to the system of equations (39) obtained using these 
elasticity decompositions is given in equation (50). Comparing the two- and 
three-quality solutions (i.e., equations (27) and (50)), the nested nature of the 
results is revealed. The ﬁrst- and second-stage eﬀects from the two-good 
solution are modiﬁed slightly for the three-good case, and third-stage 
substitution and expansion eﬀects are added. Notably, there are no third-
stage eﬀects for the quantity and producer and consumer prices of the low-
quality good, as the third-stage eﬀects allocate expenditure between white 
and red premium wines, just as the second-stage eﬀects allocate expenditure 
between cask and premium wines. 3232 
d ln QL g 666666666664
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